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New evidence on corruption and government debt from a 
global country panel: a non-linear panel long-run approach 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This paper explores the link between corruption and government debt 
through a regime-based approach.  
Design/methodology/approach –The empirical analysis makes use of a panel of 120 
countries, spanning the period 1999-2015. The study makes use of the Panel Smooth 
Transition Regression (PSTR) methodological approach, as well as two alternative 
measures of corruption.  
Findings – The empirical results document that the relationship between corruption 
and debt is non-linear, while a strong threshold eﬀect was present as well. Public debt 
appears to respond faster to a high corruption regime compared to a low corruption 
regime, while an increase in the size of the shadow economy, government expenses, 
the inflation rate, interest payments on debt and military expenditure all increased the 
debt to GDP ratio. By contrast, an increase in GDP per capita, the secondary school 
enrollment ratio and the ratio of tax revenues to GDP led to a fall in the debt to GDP 
ratio. The findings survive certain robust checks when the role of the 2008 financial 
crisis is explicitly considered, as well as when two separate country samples were 
considered, i.e. developed vs developing countries.  
Practical implications – Governments should aim to control both corruption and the 
size of the shadow economy if they really wish to reduce any high levels of their 
public debt. As debt levels respond faster to high corruption regimes, it is necessary 
that measures to reduce corruption are complemented by higher GDP per capita 
growth rates, enrolment rates and higher tax revenues. 
Originality/value – The major novelty of the paper is that it investigates for the first 
time the likely presence of non-linearity between corruption and government debt, by 
using a PSTR methodological framework. It proposes non-linear panel cointegration 
and causality tests, as well as a non-linear panel error correction model that allows for 
smooth changes between regimes, hence, examining causal relationships in each 
regime separately. 
Keywords: corruption; shadow economy; government debt; 120 countries; panel data 
JEL Classification: E6; H63; C33 
Paper type: Research paper 
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Introduction 
The effects of corruption on public debt have been investigated by Cooray et al. 
(2017). They use a panel of 126 countries and show that corruption adversely affects 
public debt, while the extent of the shadow economy exacerbates this relationship. We 
extend upon the study of Cooray et al. (2017) by using the Panel Smooth Transition 
Regression (PSTR) model of González et al. (2005) to examine potential threshold 
effects in the relationship between debt and corruption. The main novelty of the paper 
is that it investigates the presence of non-linearity between corruption and government 
debt by using a non-linear panel cointegration methodology, as well as a non-linear 
panel error correction model that allows for smooth changes between regimes. The 
non-linear estimations can provide insight on whether the relationship between 
corruption and public debt changes over different states of corruption. While Cooray 
et al. (2017) investigate for non-linearity in the debt-corruption relation, by using 
quadratic terms, the PSTR model is particularly useful when the non-linear dynamics 
are attributed to a common regime-switching component, especially when the reaction 
to this component may differ across variables. This method allows us to  relax the 
restricting assumption of a constant adjustment toward equilibrium. The PSTR 
methodology takes explicitly into account heterogeneity by allowing regression 
coefﬁcients to change as a function of an exogenous variable and to ﬂuctuate across 
regimes. As the transition variable is individual-speciﬁc and time varying, the 
regression coefﬁcients for each of the individuals in the panel are changing over time. 
Additionally, this approach permits smooth changes in country-speciﬁc associations, 
depending upon a threshold. Discovering regime-dependent interactions across the 
variables under investigation is highly significant for designing regulatory policies. 
There has been abundance in the literature exploring the role of corruption
1
 in 
the economy. In particular, corruption has been shown to been detrimental to growth 
(Mo, 2001; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002), foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000; Abed 
and Davoodi, 2002), productivity (Lambsdorff, 2003), inflation (Al-Marhubi, 2000), 
confining the shadow economy (Friedman et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2010), 
government bond ratings (Depken and Lafountain, 2006), government expenses on 
                                                
1 Corruption is defined as the abuse of public power for private gains (Buehn and Schneider, 2009). 
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education and health (Mauro, 1998), and the economic status of the poor (Justesen 
and Bjornskov, 2014). 
 By contrast, certain studies argue that the presence of corruption could be 
efficiency improving for the economy. Leff (1964), Johnson (1975), Wedeman (1997) 
and Liu (1996) present evidence that corruption reduces bureaucracy, thus leading to 
higher economic growth, while Aidt (2009) and Meon and Weill (2010) display that 
this growth effect of corruption depends on the institutional environment in the 
economy. Dzhumashev (2014) illustrates that the link between corruption and 
governance determines the efficiency of public expenses, and, hence, the 
abovementioned growth effect of corruption. 
 At the same time, the relationship between corruption and the shadow 
economy has been explored by two schools of thought. Tanzi (1998) supports the first 
approach and argues that those who evade taxes are considered to be part of the 
shadow economy, while the second approach supports that the absence of solid 
institutions in the economy, i.e. higher levels of corruption results in a enhanced 
shadow economy (Dreher et al., 2009). In contrast, Friedman et al. (2000) argue that 
corruption and the shadow economy do not have to act in a substitute manner, but 
complementarily, given that weak institutions and enhanced corruption drive 
individuals and firms underground. His arguments have found solid empirical support 
extensively in the literature (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Dreher and Schneider, 2010, 
Kaufmann, 2010). However, only a limited literature examines the issue of how 
corruption impacts government debt. Johnson et al. (1997) and Friedman et al. (2000) 
provide evidence to the question on the fact that tax evasion undermines 
governments’ ability to provide public goods, thus, making them turn to more 
intensive borrowing activities, leading to a vicious cycle of corruption and borrowing.  
     Corruption can affect a government’s budget balance and government debt 
through a number of transmission mechanisms. The budget balance has implications 
for the level of government debt2. Budget deﬁcits (surpluses) are associated with 
increasing (decreasing) levels of public debt. If a government runs a budget deﬁcit, it 
will borrow an amount equal to the size of the deﬁcit. Governments can borrow by 
selling government bonds which will lead to a rise in the level of public debt. 
Corruption can increase public expenses due to rent seeking (Tanzi and Davoodi 
                                                
2
 Note, the stock of government debt at the end of period t is equal to the stock of government debt at 
the end of period t−1 minus the budget balance (deﬁcit or surplus) in period t. 
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2002). In corrupt societies, government officials are inclined to demand bribes from 
those undertaking large scale capital intensive projects (Kaufmann 2010) leading to 
higher budget deficits and higher issuance of bonds to finance such projects. At the 
same time, corruption can change the structure of such public expenses and away 
from sectors such as education and health towards sectors characterized by less 
transparency and harder monitoring, such as defense expenses (Gupta et al., 2001; 
Wei, 2001). A government can alternatively increase taxes; however, increasing taxes 
have economic and political consequences. 
Corruption can affect government debt through a number of transmission 
mechanisms. Tanzi and Davoodi (2002) support that corruption leads to increased 
public expenses. Kaufmann (2010) argues that government officials are inclined to 
bribe taking from capital intensive projects; therefore, higher levels of government 
debt are issued to finance such projects. At the same time, corruption can change the 
structure of such public expenses and away from sectors such as education and health 
towards sectors characterized by less transparency and harder monitoring, such as 
defense expenses (Gupta et al., 2001; Wei, 2001). 
          We consider a non-linear causal investigation between corruption, and 
government debt and we are interested in analyzing the corruption-public debt 
relationship once we depart from the assumption of common parameters across all 
countries. Studies have indicated that the relationship between corruption and 
economic activity may well be non-linear (Méndez and Sepúlveda, 2006; Del Monte 
and Papagni, 2007; Aidt et al., 2008) and vary across regions (Montinola and 
Jackman, 2002). Theories of multiple equilibria suggest that as more resources are 
devoted to corruption, the returns to corruption and productivity will fall, and beyond 
some threshold point, the returns to production will be falling at a faster rate to the 
returns to corruption, with corruption exhibiting increasing returns (Murphy et al., 
1993). It is, therefore, possible to argue that as productivity falls, it leads to an 
increased need for greater borrowing, particularly in countries which are financially 
constrained. This could lead to the presence of a number of equilibria between 
corruption and debt, suggesting that the corruption-debt relationship can vary not only 
with time, but also according to the type of the regime. Similarly, shocks can give rise 
to changes in the corruption-debt relationship. Econometrically, it is known that 
ignoring the impact of cross-section correlation, arising from global shocks or other 
spillover effects, yields seriously biased estimates for the parameters of interest 
(Phillips and Sul, 2003; Andrews, 2005), while non-linearities may spuriously appear 
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if heterogeneous relationships are erroneously modeled as common across countries 
(Haque et al., 1999).  
          As mentioned above, shocks can give rise to changes in the corruption-debt 
relationship. Therefore, a second contribution of this study is that it also examines the 
effect of the recent global financial crisis and its potential distorting impact on 
identifying the debt-corruption economy nexus in the data (cross-section correlation). 
During recessions, governments may borrow to finance temporarily larger budget 
deficits associated with the effects of automatic stabilisers and discretionary fiscal 
policy. A government can alternatively raise taxes and/or reduce government 
spending; but this would increase the size of the contractionary gap and lead to deeper 
recession. According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), financial and/or banking crises 
often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises, while Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and 
Velasco (1987) argue that governments frequently take on massive debts from the 
private banks, thus, undermining their own solvency. This type of ‘twin crises’, has 
been identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, b),  as largely owing to collapsing 
revenues, while government debt typically rises significantly in the years following a 
systemic financial crisis, setting the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst-case 
scenario, default. Moreover, the incidence of crisis can also contribute to the 
incidence of bribery and corruption. In particular, it has been argued that the victims 
of the economic crisis are more likely to engage in corrupt exchanges than the non-
victims. The explanation is lying on reasons, such as that people hit by an adverse 
income shock may be more likely to pay bribes to public officials (Pathak et al., 2008; 
Mistry and Jalal, 2012), or that among all those people who contact public officials, 
crisis victims may end up paying bribes more frequently than the non-victims because 
the stress of the change in circumstances makes them more vulnerable to abuse by 
public officials which can change the corruption-debt relationship. Finally, the 
empirical analysis is undertaken by dividing the sample into two: developed and the 
developing countries as corruption is likely to be higher in developing countries 
(Svensson 2005). 
          The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while Section 3 
presents the methodology employed. Section 4 presents and evaluates the empirical 
results and, finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
Data 
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The analysis makes use of annual data from 120 countries, spanning the period 1999-
2015. The list of countries can be seen in the Appendix. Their selection was 
exclusively based on data availability. 
 The dependent variable is the ratio of public debt to GDP. The primary 
independent variable is corruption, which is measured through two alternative 
measures: i) the corruption Perceptions Index made available from Transparency 
International. The index ranges from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (not corrupt). For 
simplification purposes, the index has been reversed (i.e., 0 stands for not corrupt and 
10 for totally corrupt), and ii) the corruption measure recommended by Kaufmann et 
al. (2013), which ranges from -2.5 (totally corrupt) to 2.5 (totally corrupt). This index 
has been also scales so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 5 for totally corrupt. Finally, 
this corruption measure is available only in 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 to 2015. For 
the cases in 1999 and 2001 we made use of the same data from 1998 and 2000, 
respectively. 
 Other control variables entering the model procedure are: the size of the 
shadow economy3, given that corrupt economies tend to have larger segments of their 
shadow parts, thus, experiencing higher government debts (Cooray et al. 2017). Data 
on the shadow economy come from Schneider et al. (2010). They define the drivers 
that determine a shadow economy as: i) the overall tax and social security 
contribution burden, ii) the intensity of regulations, iii) public sector services and iv) 
the official sector. They measure it by using the Multiple Indicator Multiple Cause 
(MIMIC) approach to estimate it. Their estimates cover the span 1999-2007. To fill in 
the missing data, the analysis extrapolates the data. In addition, the modeling 
approach employs the ratio of government expenses to GDP as a control variable 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002), GDP per capita, the secondary enrollment ratio (both to 
measure the development level of the economy), the inflation rate (Al-Marhubi, 
2000), tax revenues as a ratio of GDP (Schneider et al., 2010; Kaufmann, 2010), and 
interest payments on debt as a ratio of GDP (Kaufmann, 2010). Table I reports 
descriptive statistics. The basic equation of interest for our analysis is described as 
follows: 
Debtit = β1 x’it + uit          (1) 
                                                
3
 The shadow economy is defined as ‘the market-based production of goods and services that escapes 
detection in official estimates of GDP’ (Smith, 1994). 
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7
where x’ is a vector of all control variables mentioned above, and uit = αi + fi + εit, 
with αi capturing country-specific intercepts, fi being a set of unobserved common 
factors, and εit depicting a random error term that captures the effect of all omitted 
variables.  
 [Insert Table I about here] 
 
Methodology 
All the asymptotic theory for the Panel Smooth Threshold Regression (PSTR) model 
is based on the hypothesis of stationary regressors. Therefore, the procedures of PSTR 
specification rely on the assumption that all variables in the modeling approach are 
I(0) process. In order to analyze stationarity properties of the data, we test whether the 
data have a unit root. Panel unit root tests of the first-generation can lead to spurious 
results (because of size distortions), if significant degrees of positive residual cross-
section dependence exist and are ignored. Consequently, the implementation of 
second-generation panel unit root tests is desirable only when it has been established 
that the panel is subject to a significant degree of residual cross-section dependence. 
In the cases where cross-section dependence is not sufficiently high, a loss of power 
might result if second-generation panel unit root tests that allow for cross-section 
dependence are employed. Therefore, before selecting the appropriate panel unit root 
test, it is crucial to provide some evidence on the degree of residual cross-section 
dependence.  
The cross-sectional dependence (CD) statistic by Pesaran (2004) is based on a 
simple average of all pair-wise correlation coefficients of the OLS residuals obtained 
from standard augmented Dickey-Fuller regressions for each variable in the panel. 
Under the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence, the CD test statistic 
follows asymptotically a two-tailed standard normal distribution. The results 
uniformly reject the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, providing 
evidence of cross-sectional dependence in the data given the statistical significance of 
the CD statistics. 
Two second-generation panel unit root tests are employed to determine the 
degree of integration in the respective variables. The Pesaran (2007) panel unit root 
test does not require the estimation of factor loading to eliminate cross-sectional 
dependence. Specifically, the usual ADF regression is augmented to include the 
lagged cross-sectional mean and its first difference to capture the cross-sectional 
dependence that arises through a single-factor model.  The null hypothesis is a unit 
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root for the Pesaran (2007) test. The bootstrap panel unit root tests by Smith et al. 
(2004) utilize a sieve sampling scheme to account for both the time series and cross-
sectional dependence in the data through bootstrap blocks. All four tests by Smith et 
al. (2004) are constructed with a unit root under the null hypothesis and 
heterogeneous autoregressive roots under the alternative hypothesis. The results of 
these panel unit root tests are reported in Table II and support the presence of a unit 
root across all variables under consideration, except in the case of inflation, where the 
variable turns out to be stationary at its levels. 
[Insert Table II about here] 
 
To detect the potential non-linear relationship between public debt and corruption, we 
use the PSTR model developed by González et al. (2005). We express the simplest 
case of a PSTR with threshold one or two extreme regimes and a single transition 
function to illustrate the relationship between public debt and corruption: 
Debtit = αi + β0 x’it + β1’ xit F(πit, γ, c) + εit        (1) 
where i = 1. . ..N, t = 1. . ...T; N and T denote the cross-section and time dimensions 
of the panel, respectively; αi represents fixed country effects and εit is the error term. 
xit is a k-dimensional vector of time-varying control variables. The transition function 
F is a continuous function and depends on the threshold variable (CORit), while these 
extreme values are associated with regression coefficients β0 and (β0 + β1). González 
et al. (2005) consider, following Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) for the time series 
STAR models, the following logistic transition function: 
    m 
F(πit, γ, c) = [1 + exp(-γ Π (CORit –c))]-1 with γ>0 and c1≤c2≤…cm  (2) 
   j=1 
where cj = (c1,....,cm)’, which is an m–dimensional vector of parameters; the slope 
parameter γ determines the smoothness of the transition. For m = 1, the model has the 
two extreme regimes separating low and high values of it. For a higher value γ, the 
transition becomes rougher and the transition function F becomes the indicator 
function F(CORit, c). When γ tends towards infinite, the indicator function F(CORit, c) 
=1 if event CORit > c occurs, and the indicator function F(CORit, c) = 0, otherwise. 
When γ is close to 0, the transition function F is constant. In that case, the PSTR 
converges towards the two–regime panel threshold regression (PTR) of Hansen 
(1999). With regard to the specifications of panel analysis or PTR, the main advantage 
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9
of the PSTR is that it allows the public debt-corruption coefficient to vary according 
to the country and with the time. The PSTR model allows individuals move between 
groups and over time depending on changes in the threshold variable. The PSTR 
model also provides a parametric approach of the cross-country heterogeneity and of 
the time instability of the public debt-corruption coefficients, since these parameters 
change smoothly as a function of a threshold variable. González et al. (2005) propose 
the following specification procedure for PSTR:  
(i) Test the linearity against the PSTR model; (ii) Parameter estimation; (iii) Test for 
number of transition functions. More specifically: 
(i) Testing for linearity = testing the linearity in a PSTR model, Equation (1) can be 
done by testing H0: γ = 0 or H0: β0 = β1. However, in both cases, the test will be 
nonstandard since under H0 the PSTR model contains unidentified nuisance 
parameters. This issue is evident from the literature devoted to the time series 
threshold models (Hansen, 1999). Therefore, González et al. (2005), following 
Luukkonen et al. (1998) replace F in Equation (1) by its first–order Taylor expansion 
round γ = 0 and obtain the auxiliary regression: 
Debtit = αi + β0 xit + β1’ xit CORit + … + βm’ xit CORit
m + εit    (3) 
where the parameter vectors (β’1,.....,β’m) are multiples of γ. Thus, testing H0 in 
Equation (1) is equivalent to testing the H∗0 : β’1 + .... + β’m = 0 in Equation (3). This 
null hypothesis may be conveniently tested by a Wald and Likelihood ratio tests. If we 
denote SSR0 the panel sum of squared residuals under H0 (linear panel model with 
individual effects) and SSR1 the panel sum of squared residuals under H1 (PSTR 
model with two regimes), the Wald LM test can be written as:  
LMW = N T (SSR0 – SSR1) / SSR0         (4) 
where the Likelihood Ratio test can be written as:  
LR = −2 [log (SSR1) − log(SSR0)]         (5) 
(ii) Parameter estimation = The parameters (β’0, β’1, γ, c) in Equation (1) are 
estimated in two steps: (a) eliminate the individual effects by removing individual-
specific means and (b) apply non-linear least squares (NLS) to the transformed data. 
The analysis applies NLS to determine the values of these parameters that minimize 
the concentrated sum of squared errors. While estimating the PSTR model, a practical 
issue that deserves special attention is the selection of starting values for γ and c, such 
that γ > 0, ci,min > min(CORit), cj,max < max(CORit), j = 1,...., m.  
(iii) Testing for the number of transition functions = The logic is similar when it 
comes to testing the number of transition functions (r) in the model or equivalently 
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order of extreme regimes (r + 1). (González et al., 2005) propose a sequential 
approach by testing the null hypothesis of no remaining non-linearity in the transition 
function. In the PSTR framework, we assume that the linearity hypothesis is rejected. 
The issue is then to test whether there is one transition function (H0: r = 1) or whether 
there are at least two transition functions (H0: r = 2). Consider the model with r = 2 or 
three regimes: 
Debtit = αi + β0’ x’it + β1’ xit F1(CORit
1
, γ1, c1) + β2’ xit F2(CORit
2
, γ2, c2) + ε’it   (6) 
We can replace the second transition function F2 by its first-order Taylor expansion 
around γ2 = 0, and then in testing linear constraints on the parameters. Therefore, the 
model in Equation (6) yields: 
Debtit = αi + β0’ x’it + β1’ xit F1(CORit
1, γ1, c1) + θxit CORit + ε’it     (7) 
The test of no remaining nonlinearity is simply defined by H0: θ = 0. Let us denote 
SSR0 the panel sum of squared residuals under H0, i.e. in a PSTR model with one 
transition function. Let us also denote SSR1 the sum of squared residuals of the 
transformed model in Equation (7). The testing procedure is then as follows: given a 
PSTR model with r = r∗, we will test the null H0: r = r∗ against H1: r = r∗ + 1. If H0 is 
not rejected, the procedure ends. Otherwise, the null hypothesis H0: r = r∗ + 1 is tested 
against H0: r = r∗ + 2. The testing procedure continues until the first acceptance of H0. 
 For the robustness tests, we employ a public debt regression, which contains a 
quadratic interaction term as follows:  
Debtit = αi + δ’i xit + x0’ CORit + x1’ CORit
2 + µ’it      (8)  
The interaction term is included in Equation (8) to investigate non-linear public debt 
effects of the threshold variable. This allows us to detect whether, beyond a certain 
level, the threshold variable becomes more or less important in determining the 
marginal effect of corruption on the public debt.  
             
Empirical results 
For the test of linearity, we check whether the order m is one. The results of the 
specification test in Equation (1) are presented in Table III. The findings show the p-
value of the Lagrange multiplier, as well as that of the Likelihood-ratio test for the 
null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of logistic (m=1) or exponent (m = 
2) PSTR specification. These findings document that the null hypothesis of linearity is 
rejected at the 1% significance level. Moreover, the rejection of linearity is stronger 
for m = 1, therefore, the logistic specification (m = 1) is preferred to the exponent one 
(m = 2). Therefore, there is a non-linear relationship between public debt and 
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corruption across our countries in the sample. In that case, we employ the estimation 
of non-linear modeling approach by using the PSTR specification.  
[Insert Table III about here] 
 
Next, the analysis does a grid search to obtain threshold values c for the PSTR model. 
The optimal threshold value is one that minimizes the sequence of RSS in Equation 
(1). The search is performed from 1% to 90% for the sample, which yields 90 panel 
regressions of Equation (1). The minimization values of the RSS and AIC are reached 
at the semi-log of COR = 0.914, which is converted to 5.34 for the CPI corruption 
index and at the semi-log of COR = 0.17, which is converted to 1.19 for the CK 
index. The results illustrate that the estimated threshold value is 5.34 for the case of 
the CPI corruption index and 1.19 for the case of the CK index. 
The estimation of PSTR needs testing no remaining linearity. We have strong 
evidence on the presence of one threshold in the model. In the case where the 
hypothesis without threshold (r = 0) is rejected at the 1% significance for two tests, 
while in the case where the hypothesis with at least two thresholds (r = 2) is also 
rejected. In the former case, both the Lagrange Multiplier and the Likelihood Ratio 
tests are 6.37[p-value=0.00] and 29.82[p-value=0.00], respectively, while in the 
second case the results are 6.68[p-value=0.00] and 30.96[0.00], respectively. These 
findings imply that the relationship between corruption and public debt has only one 
threshold, i.e. two regimes.  
The analysis applies the PSTR non-linear least squares to data to eliminate the 
individual effects. Table IV reports the PSTR estimates. The results illustrate that the 
effect of corruption on public debt is non-linear. In particular, in the case of the CPI 
corruption index and for the low corruption regime, corruption is estimated to be 
0.037 which is statistically significant at 10%. For the case of high corruption regime, 
the corresponding coefficient is 0.095 and turns out to be statistically significant at 
1%. The results indicate that public debt responds faster to corruption in the high 
corruption regime compared to the low corruption regime. This result, perhaps, is 
explained by the fact that rent seeking increases at an increasing rate in the high 
corruption regime, leading to an increase in the need for public debt which causes 
public debt to respond faster to corruption in the high corruption regime.  
         In terms of the remaining control variables, the findings illustrate that the 
presence of a shadow economy, the government expenses to GDP ratio, the inflation 
rate, the interest payments on debt as a ratio of GDP and the ratio of military expenses 
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to GDP ratio all exert a positive impact on the debt to GDP ratio. These findings are 
consistent with the previous literature. While Cooray et al. (2017) do not test for 
threshold effects, they find that both corruption and the shadow economy have a 
positive effect on the debt ratio, while Al-Marhubi (2000) shows that more corrupted 
countries face higher inflation. Similarly, Reinhart and Rogeff (2010) find that higher 
inflation can reduce the real value of the debt stock or alternatively, increase interest 
payments on debt, thereby increasing the stock of debt itsef. More corrupted 
governments could face higher debt servicing costs, implying that an increase in the 
rate of interest would lead to an increase in their public debt (Kaufmann, 2010). 
Similarly, if military expenditure is financed by borrowing, both public debt and debt 
servicing costs could increase (Cooray et al., 2017). By contrast, GDP per capita, the 
secondary school enrollment ratio and the ratio of tax revenues to GDP all have a 
negative effect on the debt to GDP ratio. The results remain consistently similar for 
the case of the CK corruption index. 
 [Insert Table IV about here] 
 
The analysis is also concerned about the role of common shocks, that is, the recent 
(2008) financial crisis, in relevance to their impact on identifying the debt-corruption 
economy nexus. Financial and/or banking crises can often precede or accompany 
sovereign debt crises (Reinhart and Rogoff 2011). Large debts taken during periods of 
crisis are often due to falling revenues and rising debt (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009a, b). 
Crisis victims may need to reveal their financial position to public officials to access 
public services and this information can trigger extortion. Alternatively, crisis victims 
may be willing to pay bribes to public officials to get the service quicker or make sure 
it is of higher quality (Hunt, 2007). Thus, crises can contribute to the incidence of 
bribery and corruption leading to a change in the relationship between corruption and 
debt. 
 Based on the above discussion, we repeat the empirical analysis by 
incorporating a dummy variable that considers the role of the 2008 financial crisis in 
the nexus between public debt and corruption. This dummy variable takes the value of 
one at 2008 and zero otherwise. Once again, both the Lagrange Multiplier and the 
Likelihood-Ratio tests for the null hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of 
logistic (m=1) or exponent (m = 2) PSTR specification are 7.11[p-value=0.00] and 
25.49[p-value=0.00], respectively, in the former case and 7.47[p-value=0.00] and 
28.19[p-value=0.00], respectively, in the latter case, denoting again that the null 
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hypothesis of linearity is rejected at the 1% significance level. Once again, the 
rejection of linearity is stronger for m = 1, therefore, recommending the selection of 
the logistic specification and that there is a non-linear relationship between public 
debt and corruption across our countries in the sample, indicating that changes in the 
economic environment can lead to changes in the debt-corruption relationship. The 
grid search process also obtains threshold values c, indicating that the minimization 
values this time are reached at the semi-log of COR = 0.901, which is converted to 
5.22 for the CPI corruption index and at the semi-log of COR = 0.15, which is 
converted to 1.14 for the CK index. Moreover, testing of no remaining non-linearity 
indicates (again) the presence of strong evidence of one threshold in the model. In the 
case where the hypothesis without threshold (r = 0) is rejected at the 1% significance 
for two tests (LM test = 6.19[p-value=0.00], LR test = 26.30[p-value=0.00]), while in 
the case where the hypothesis with at least two thresholds (r = 2) is also rejected (LM 
test = 6.24[p-value=0.00]. LR test = 27.16[p-value=0.00]). These findings imply that 
the relationship between corruption and public debt has (again) only one threshold or 
two regimes. 
Next, Table V reports the new PSTR estimates. The new results illustrate that 
the effect of corruption on public debt is (again) non-linear. In particular, in the case 
of the CPI corruption index and for the low corruption regime, corruption is estimated 
to be 0.032 which is statistically significant at 10%. By contrast, for the case of high 
corruption regime, the corresponding coefficient is 0.083 which is statistically 
significant at 1%. In terms of the remaining control variables, the findings provide 
robust evidence to those reported in Table IV. In terms of the financial crisis dummy 
variable, the estimates clearly illustrate that the crisis event had a positive and 
statistically significant impact on the debt to GDP ratio. Such findings seem to be 
consistent with those provided in the literature (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b; 2011). 
Once again, the results remain consistently similar for the case of the CK corruption 
index. 
 [Insert Table V about here] 
 
This section repeats the empirical analysis by separating the overall sample into the 
developed and the developing country samples. According to Svensson (2005), 
corruption is rampant, mostly in the developing world and more prevalent in 
developing countries than in developed ones. Nevertheless, corruption appears to be 
present even in developed countries, especially in those with high-income inequality 
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like the U.S., where the average voter has little impact in comparison to that of high-
income voters (Ali and Saha, 2016). The Appendix depicts the split country samples. 
 Therefore, the empirical analysis is performed across the two country samples. 
Both the Lagrange Multiplier and the Likelihood-Ratio tests investigate the null 
hypothesis of linearity against the alternative of logistic (m=1) or exponent (m = 2) 
PSTR specification across the two samples (LM=9.75[p-value=0.00], LR=32.84[p-
value=0.00] for developed countries and LM=6.58[p-value=0.00), LR=26.10[p-
value=0.00] for developing countries). The findings display that the null hypothesis of 
linearity is rejected at the 1% significance level across both samples, while, the 
rejection of linearity is stronger for m=1, recommending the selection of the logistic 
specification in both country sample specifications. The grid search analysis provides 
relevant information about the transition parameter γ. More specifically, in the case of 
the developed country sample, the minimization values are reached at the semi-log of 
COR = 0.925, which is converted to 5.40 for the CPI corruption index and at the 
semi-log of COR = 0.21, which is converted to 1.26 for the CK index, while in the 
case of the developing country sample, the respective values are reached at the semi-
log of COR = 0.903, which is converted to 5.25 for the CPI corruption index and at 
the semi-log of COR = 0.13, which is converted to 1.10 for the CK index 
Table VI reports the PSTR estimates across the two country samples under 
investigation. The findings illustrate that the effect of corruption on public debt is 
(again) non-linear in both cases. In particular, in the case of the developed countries 
and in relevance to the CPI corruption index and for the low corruption regime, 
corruption is estimated to be 0.038, which is statistically significant at 10%. By 
contrast, for the case of high corruption regime, the corresponding coefficient is 
0.099, which is statistically significant at 1%. Once again, the results remain 
consistently similar for the case of the CK corruption index. In terms of the 
developing country sample and the CPI corruption index, the findings for the low 
corruption regime indicate a coefficient of 0.022, which is statistically insignificant, 
and for the high corruption regime, the coefficient turns out to be 0.071, which is 
statistically significant at 1%.  
 [Insert Table VI about here] 
 
Finally, based on a reviewer’s recommendation, as well as on literature’s evidence 
(Sambanis, 2004; Khan, 2006), we repeat the analysis by dropping countries such as 
Albania, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, 
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Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Venezuela, Zambia and Zimbabwe that are considered 
as ‘failed states’ in terms of their corruption levels. The term ‘state failure’ is 
associated with the rent-seeking literature, which emphasizes the economic costs of 
state intervention. The message of this literature is that state failure, in the form of 
inefficient growth-retarding institutional issues, such as corruption and shadow 
economy, is often more costly to the economy in terms of rent-seeking and corruption 
costs than the market failures states are attempting to correct (Krueger, 1974; Rotberg, 
2003). The problem in many less developed countries has not been only poor 
economic performance, but also a breakdown in the legitimacy and political viability 
of these states (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). The new robustness results are reported in 
Table VII. Although the new findings provide robust evidence about the non-linear 
effect of corruption on public debt, the impact is lower in quantitative terms. More 
specifically, in the case of the CPI corruption index and for the low corruption regime, 
corruption is estimated to be 0.024. For the case of high corruption regime, the 
corresponding coefficient is 0.057. These findings indicate that public debt responds 
faster to corruption in the high corruption regime, but the speed is lower 
comparatively to the case that the failed states were included in the analysis. 
Moreover, in the case of the CK corruption index and for the low corruption regime, 
corruption is estimated to be 0.020, but it turns out to be statistically insignificant, 
while for the case of high corruption regime, the corresponding coefficient is 0.041.  
 [Insert Table VII about here] 
 
Conclusion 
This paper examined the (non-linear) relationship between corruption, government 
debt and the shadow economy in a panel of 120 countries, spanning the period 1999-
2015. Using the Panel Smooth Transition Regression (PSTR) model of González et al. 
(2005), as well as two alternative measures of corruption, the empirical results 
documented that higher levels of corruption led to higher government debt. This result 
is consistent with that by Cooray et al. (2017). The results of the present study 
however, further indicated that the relationship between corruption and debt was non-
linear, while a strong threshold eﬀect was present as well.  
       The results indicated that the estimated threshold value was 5.34 for the case of 
the CPI corruption index and 1.19 for the case of the CK index. Such findings suggest 
that every effort should be made to reduce corruption as it approaches these threshold 
levels. In particular, public debt appears to respond faster to a high corruption regime 
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compared to a low corruption regime. The findings further indicated that an increase 
in the size of the shadow economy, government expenses, the inflation rate, interest 
payments on debt and military expenditure all increased the debt to GDP ratio. By 
contrast, an increase in GDP per capita, the secondary school enrollment ratio and the 
ratio of tax revenues to GDP led to a fall in the debt to GDP ratio. Finally, the results 
received robust support when the role of the 2008 financial crisis was explicitly 
considered, as well as in the case when two separate country samples were 
considered, i.e. developed vs developing countries. Finally, the results remain 
consistent even the analysis dropped a number of ‘failed states’, although the speed of 
adjustment of public debt to changes in corruption was much slower across both 
regimes. 
         The results carry the following policy implications: governments should aim to 
control both corruption and the size of the shadow economy if they really wish to 
reduce any high levels of their public debt. In particular, as debt levels respond faster 
to high corruption regimes, it is necessary that measures to reduce corruption are 
complemented by higher GDP per capita growth rates, enrolment rates and higher tax 
revenues. 
 
Appendix 
List of overall countries 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, FYROM, 
Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Korea Republic, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 
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United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
List of developed countries 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Korea Republic, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, 
United Kingdom, United States. 
 
List of developing countries 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, FYROM, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Lithuania, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
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Table I. 
Descriptive statistics 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     Mean    SD   Min           Max 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI)   6.96    1.08  0.16            8.94 
 
Corruption Kaufmann et al. (CK)   3.41    0.95  0.42            4.61 
 
Shadow economy (% of GDP)              36.73  10.93  11.4          66.18 
 
Government debt (% of GDP)              63.49  50.48  1.43        275.41 
 
Debt servicing ratio (% of GDP)              3.83             33.81             1.04          87.52 
 
Government expenses to GDP             14.28  6.32  2.01          67.81 
 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 $)       1,649.86      1,732.14           78.43     9,578.44 
 
Secondary school enrollment (%)            60.14           26.52             4.97        117.82 
 
Inflation    26.19         177.93            -5.14        239.18 
 
Tax revenues to GDP   14.21  6.35             0.10          60.47 
 
Interest payments on debt  
to GDP                 11.49           12.82  5.61          98.72 
 
Military expenses to GDP   2.29  2.36  0.08          41.63 
 
No. of observations = 2,040 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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Table II.  
Panel unit root tests 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Pesaran             Pesaran              Smith et Smith et Smith et Smith et 
Variables   CIPS  CIPS*  al.-t-test al.-LM-test al.-max-test al.-min-test 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 
CPI    -1.18  -1.25  -1.26    2.84  -1.31  1.35 
∆CPI    -5.72*** -5.96*** -5.88*** 21.35*** -6.10*** 6.27*** 
CK    -1.22  -1.29  -1.25    2.79  -1.35  1.39 
∆CK    -5.68*** -5.84*** -5.75*** 20.36*** -5.92*** 6.18*** 
Shadow economy  -1.20  -1.32  -1.36    2.94  -1.40  1.42 
∆Shadow economy  -6.11*** -6.58*** -6.31*** 21.15*** -6.58*** 6.67*** 
Government debt  -1.29  -1.37  -1.32    2.83  -1.39  1.47 
∆Government debt  -6.14*** -6.35*** -6.17*** 20.84*** -6.38*** 6.83*** 
Debt servicing ratio  -1.25  -1.31  -1.39    2.71  -1.44  1.50 
∆Debt servicing ratio  -5.93*** -6.24*** -6.28*** 21.05*** -6.45*** 6.74*** 
Government expenses  -1.33  -1.40  -1.35    2.77  -1.43  1.49 
∆Government expenses    -6.10*** -6.48*** -6.20*** 21.24*** -6.31*** 6.61*** 
GDP per capita               -1.36  -1.42  -1.35    2.82  -1.45  1.53 
∆GDP per capita  -6.24*** -6.44*** -6.32*** 21.14*** -6.64*** 6.78*** 
School enrollment  -1.29  -1.37  -1.33    2.95  -1.39  1.48 
∆School enrollment  -5.92*** -6.31*** -6.15*** 21.38*** -6.38*** 6.85*** 
Inflation   -6.14*** -6.58*** -6.36*** 21.95*** -6.69*** 6.81*** 
Tax revenues   -1.37  -1.44  -1.35    2.80  -1.41  1.45 
∆Tax revenues               -6.04*** -6.38*** -6.27*** 20.74*** -6.53*** 6.70*** 
Interest payments  -1.28  -1.39  -1.35    2.85  -1.46  1.51 
∆Interest payment  -5.92*** -6.22*** -6.09*** 20.55*** -6.38*** 6.58*** 
Military expenses  -1.24  -1.28  -1.25    2.92  -1.34  1.38 
∆Military expenses  -6.28*** -6.40*** -6.31*** 21.06*** -6.46*** 6.74*** 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ∆ denotes first differences. A constant is included in the Pesaran (2007) tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one country. CIPS* = truncated 
CIPS test. Critical values for the Pesaran (2007) test are -2.40 at 1%, -2.22 at 5%, and -2.14 at 10%, respectively.  “a” denotes rejection of the null hypothesis. Both a constant and a 
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time trend are included in the Smith et al. (2004) tests. Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates stationarity in at least one country.  For both tests the results are reported at lag = 4. 
The null hypothesis is that of a unit root. ***:≤0.01. 
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Table III. 
Tests of linearity 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Test          m=1    m=2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
CPI corruption index 
Lagrange multiplier (LM)    7.39***   1.09 
Likelihood ratio (LR)   28.93***   4.38 
CK corruption index 
Lagrange multiplier (LM)    7.85***   1.03 
Likelihood ratio (LR)   30.71***   3.72 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: ***: p≤0.01. H0: Linear model; H1: PSTR model with m = 1 or m = 2. 
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Table IV.  
PSTR estimates (Dependent variable: public debt as percent of GDP) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     Coefficient            p-value 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
CPI corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.294***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.127***   0.01 
GDP per capita               -0.176***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.083*    0.08 
Inflation rate      0.027***   0.00 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.308***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.195***   0.00 
Military expe ses to GDP   0.248**   0.05 
Corruption     0.037*    0.09 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.095***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      5.34 
γ      2.78 
R-squared     0.63 
Adjusted R-squared    0.55 
 
CK corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.279***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.114***   0.01 
GDP per capita               -0.158***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.069**   0.05 
Inflation rate      0.023***   0.00 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.285***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.179***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.236**   0.05 
Corruption     0.031*    0.10 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.088***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      1.19 
γ      3.12 
R-squared     0.54 
Adjusted R-squared    0.49 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05, ***: p≤0.01. 
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Table V.  
PSTR estimates (Dependent variable: public debt as percent of GDP-the model with 
the financial crisis dummy) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     Coefficient            p-value 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
CPI corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.261***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.115***   0.01 
GDP per capita               -0.158***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.069*    0.10 
Inflation rate      0.021**   0.03 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.286***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.169***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.235**   0.05 
Corruption     0.032*    0.10 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.083***   0.00 
Financial crisis dummy   0.139***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      5.22 
γ      2.58 
R-squared     0.58 
Adjusted R-squared    0.50 
 
CK corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.244***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.102***   0.01 
GDP per capita               -0.136***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.061**   0.05 
Inflation rate      0.017**   0.04 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.259***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.145***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.201**   0.05 
Corruption     0.025*    0.10 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.071***   0.01 
Financial crisis dummy   0.164***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      1.14 
γ      3.01 
R-squared     0.51 
Adjusted R-squared    0.44 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05, ***: p≤0.01. 
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Table VI.  
PSTR estimates (Dependent variable: public debt as percent of GDP- developed and 
developing country samples) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     Coefficient            p-value 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Developed countries 
CPI corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.265***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.148***   0.00 
GDP per capita               -0.199***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.105**   0.03 
Inflation rate      0.011*    0.07 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.329***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.238***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.295***   0.00 
Corruption     0.038*    0.10 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.099***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      5.40 
γ      2.79 
R-squared     0.69 
Adjusted R-squared    0.61 
 
CK corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.253***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.139***   0.00 
GDP per capita               -0.183***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.075**   0.04 
Inflation rate      0.012*    0.06 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.311***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.185***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.255***   0.01 
Corruption     0.035*    0.08 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.091***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      1.26 
γ      3.38 
R-squared     0.63 
Adjusted R-squared    0.59 
 
Developing countries 
CPI corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.315***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.109***   0.01 
GDP per capita               -0.161***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.064**   0.04 
Inflation rate      0.038*    0.06 
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Table VI (continued). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.255***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.156***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.237***   0.01 
Corruption     0.046*    0.08 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.108***   0.00 
 
Transition parameters 
c      5.25 
γ      2.48 
R-squared     0.58 
Adjusted R-squared    0.54 
 
CK corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.311***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.116***   0.00 
GDP per capita               -0.156***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.058**   0.05 
Inflation rate      0.035*    0.07 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.243***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.148***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.231***   0.01 
Corruption     0.042*    0.08 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.097***   0.01 
 
Transition parameters 
c      1.10 
γ      2.95 
R-squared     0.55 
Adjusted R-squared    0.50 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05, ***: p≤0.01. 
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Table VII.  
PSTR estimates (Dependent variable: public debt as percent of GDP)-The sample 
excludes a number of ‘failed states’ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variables     Coefficient            p-value 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
CPI corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.219***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.148***   0.00 
GDP per capita               -0.239***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.117***   0.01 
Inflation rate      0.013**   0.04 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.274***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.169***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.216*    0.06 
Corruption     0.024*    0.10 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.057***   0.01 
 
Transition parameters 
c      4.85 
γ      2.19 
R-squared     0.69 
Adjusted R-squared    0.58 
 
CK corruption index 
Shadow economy    0.226***   0.00 
Government expenses to GDP   0.129***   0.00 
GDP per capita               -0.186***   0.00 
Secondary enrollment ratio             -0.087**   0.04 
Inflation rate      0.019***   0.01 
Tax revenues as a ratio of GDP              -0.262***   0.00 
Interest payments on debt  
as a ratio of GDP     0.147***   0.00 
Military expenses to GDP   0.195*    0.06 
Corruption     0.020    0.12 
Corruption * F1(CORit, γ, c)   0.041**   0.04 
 
Transition parameters 
c      1.06 
γ      2.74 
R-squared     0.58 
Adjusted R-squared    0.51 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Note: *: p≤0.10, **: p≤0.05, ***: p≤0.01. 
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